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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PRO-
TECTION-ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN-PATERNITY SUITs-The United
States Supreme Court has held that a Texas statute which pre-
cludes paternity suits from being brought on behalf of illegitimate
children more than one year after birth violates the equal protec-
tion clause of the United States Constitution.
Mills v. Habluetzel, 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982).
In October, 1978, appellant Lois Mae Mills and the Texas De-
partment of Human Resources brought a paternity action in Texas
state court on behalf of her one year, seven month old illegitimate
child. The action sought to have appellee Dan Habluetzel judicially
established as her child's natural father and held liable for support
payments.1 The putative father asserted that the suit was barred
by the Texas one year statute of limitations governing paternity
suits brought on behalf of illegitimate children. The trial court
sustained the alleged father's assertion and dismissed the action.3
On appeal to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Mills asserted
that the statute of limitations barring the illegitimate, but not the
legitimate child from obtaining support after one year, was a de-
nial of equal protection. She also argued that there was a denial of
1. Mills v. Habluetzel, 102 S. Ct. 1549, 1552-53 (1982). Mills was joined in the action
by the Texas Department of Human Resources to whom she had assigned the support rights
as a prerequisite to collecting welfare. Id. at 1553. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1976)
which requires an applicant for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren program to "assign the State any rights to [child] support. . . " to which the child is
entitled. Id. See 102 S. Ct. at 1553 n.2; TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 46.003 (Vernon 1980),
which similarly provides for support rights to be assigned to the state.
2. 102 S. Ct. at 1553. At the time appellant's action was brought, Texas had a one year
statute of limitations on paternity actions. That statute provided: "A suit to establish the
parent-child relationship between a child who is not the legitimate child of a man and the
child's natural father by proof of paternity must be brought before the child is one year old,
or the suit is barred." Act of Sept. 1, 1975, ch. 476, § 24, 1975 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1253,
1261-62 (amended 1981).
Subsequent to the filing of the action, the statute was amended to provide for a four
year limitation on such actions. See Act of Sept. 1, 1981, ch. 674, § 2, 1981 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 2536, 2537 (codified at TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)).
The one year statute of limitations, like the succeeding four year statute was codified at
§ 13.01 of the Texas Family Code. The one year limitation will be referred to throughout as
§ 13.01.
3. 102 S. Ct. at 1553. See Mills v. Habluetzel, No. 20, 267 (D. Tex. dismissed Apr. 4,
1979), aft'd, No. 1547 (Civ. App. Tex. Jan. 31, 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982).
4. See Mills v. Habluetzel, No. 1547 (Civ. App. Tex. Jan. 31, 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct.
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due process because support for the illegitimate child was solely
dependent upon the mother's bringing timely action under the
statute, an event uncertain to occur.5 The court of civil appeals
rejected these arguments and upheld -the constitutionality of the
one year statute of limitations,' relying upon its decision in a com-
panion case, Texas Department of Human Resources v. Her-
nandez,7 in which the court held that the one year statute of limi-
tation is not tolled during the illegitimate child's minority and
does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8 The Hernandez decision relied upon the rationale in
Texas Department of Human Resources v. Chapman,9 in which
the court of civil appeals determined that the state's legitimate in-
terest in precluding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims was
rationally related to the one year limitation and consequently, did
not deny illegitimate children equal protection of the law.10
The Texas Supreme Court subsequently refused to hear Mills'
1549 (1982).
5. See id. See also infra text accompanying notes 17, 83-92.
6. 102 S. Ct. at 1553. See Mills v. Habluetzel, No. 1547 (Civ. App. Tex. Jan. 31, 1980),
rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982).
7. 595 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). Hernandez also dealt with a paternity action
brought on behalf of an illegitimate child in which the putative father raised the one year
limitation as a defense. Id. at 190. Hernandez was overruled by the Texas Supreme Court
subsequent to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in this case. See Ex rel.
J.A.M., 631 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1982).
8. 595 S.W.2d at 192. The court in Hernandez stated that since the statute of limita-
tions was part of § 13.01, it was also part of the substantive law. Therefore, it concluded
that to hold that the limitation tolled during an illegitimate's minority would "emasculate"
the statute, in addition to constituting "a disingenuous way of holding § 13.01 unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 192-93. See infra note 53. The court of civil appeals also held that if the
statute were tolled, the one year period of limitation would not start running until after the
child attained the age of majority, at which time the disability would cease to exist. 595
S.W.2d at 192.
9. 570 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Chapman was also overruled subsequent to
the Court's decision in this case in Ex rel. J.A.M., 631 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1982). See supra
note 7.
10. 102 S. Ct. at 1553. See 570 S.W.2d at 49. Such reliance was placed on Chapman by
the Hernandez court purportedly because the Texas Supreme Court had refused to grant a
writ of error in Chapman, citing "no reversible error." 595 S.W.2d at 192. In Chapman, it
was submitted that equal protection guarantees were met on the basis that illegitimate and
legitimate children are not similarly situated, since the former are fundamentally different
at birth, there being absent a legal paternal relationship. The appellate court there also
indicated that the legislature could'reasonably have determined that the mother of the ille-
gitimate would effectively protect the child's rights, and that the state's interest in prevent-
ing fraudulent claims was of more importance than the consequences of the mother's inac-
tion. Further, it was held that due process was afforded the child, since there was no
absolute foreclosure of the opportunity to bring suit, only a requirement that the action be
timely filed. 570 S.W.2d at 49-50.
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appeal, citing no reversible error. 1 Mills then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. The Court noted probable jurisdic-
tion12 and reversed, holding that a Texas statute requiring illegiti-
mate children to bring an action for support within one year from
date of birth denied those children the equal protection of the
law."3
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 4 observed that in
Gomez v. Perez15 the Court had held that whenever a state grants
an opportunity for legitimate children to obtain paternal support,
that opportunity must also be granted to illegitimate children.' 6
He maintained that the equal protection principles upon which the
Gomez decision was grounded preclude states from providing to
illegitimate children opportunities for support which are merely il-
lusory.' 7 He observed that there are often difficult personal, family,
and financial circumstances surrounding the birth of an illegiti-
mate child, and concluded that those who would normally assert
the rights of a child born out of wedlock must be afforded an ade-
quate opportunity to bring a support action on the child's behalf
despite these adverse conditions. 8
However, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the requirement
that illegitimate children be provided with a bona fide opportunity
11. 102 S. Ct. at 1553. See Mills v. Habluetzel, No. B-9337 (Tex. Dec. 31, 1980) (appli-
cation for writ of error refused - no reversible error).
12. 451 U.S. 936 (1981). After the United States Supreme Court decided to hear Mills,
but before oral argument, the Texas legislature amended § 13.01 to extend the limitation
from one year to four years. See Act of Sept. 1, 1981, ch. 674, § 2, 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2536, 2537. See supra note 2. On April 28, 1982, just 23 days after the United States Su-
preme Court handed down its decision in Mills, the Texas Supreme Court struck down the
same one year statute of limitations as being unconstitutional, relying on the holding in
Mills. However, that Texas court expressly declined to discuss the constitutionality of the
four year statute of limitations currently in effect, noting that Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence indicated that longer periods of limitation had not been approved. Ex rel. J.A.M., 631
S.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Tex. 1982). See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
13. 102 S. Ct. at 1556. The Court declined to consider Mills' due process argument. Id.
at 1553.
14. Id. at 1551. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which she was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Id. at 1556 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring). Justice Powell joined in pt. I of Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Id. at 1558 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring).
15. 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam). In Gomez, the Court struck down Texas common
law preventing an illegitimate child from obtaining paternal support, as violating equal pro-
tection guarantees. In doing so, the majority noted that problems in proving paternity "are
not to be lightly brushed aside." Id. at 538. See infra note 82.
16. 102 S. Ct. at 1553. See 409 U.S. at 538.
17. 102 S. Ct. at 1553.
18. Id.
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to obtain support does not necessitate that procedures be adopted
for illegitimate children that are coterminous with those for legiti-
mate children."' This, he reasoned, is because paternal actions for
illegitimate children, unlike those involving legitimate children, re-
quire proof of paternity. Justice Rehnquist indicated that
problems associated with proving paternity have been repeatedly
recognized by the Court. 0
Consequently, the majority stated that in support suits by ille-
gitimate children, to a greater extent than in support suits by legit-
imate children, a state has an interest in preventing the prosecu-
tion of stale or fraudulent claims, and may impose greater
restrictions on the former than on the latter.2 Justice Rehnquist
cautioned, however, that such restrictions will withstand equal pro-
tection scrutiny only to the degree that they are substantially re-
lated to a legitimate state interest.22 A state's interest in prevent-
ing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims will justify a period
of limitation sufficiently long to present a real threat of the deteri-
oration of evidence, or an increased susceptibility to fraudulent
claims.
2 3
Justice Rehnquist employed a two part equal protection test in
assessing the validity of the Texas statute.24 First, he required that
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1553-54. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 357, 361 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259, 269 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. at 538.
21. 102 S. Ct at 1554. The appellee additionally contended that other state interests
also justified the one year limitation. These included promoting family and marriage, and
discouraging people from having children out of wedlock. The Court summarily dismissed
these supposed state interests, noting that prior decisions had held that burdens should only
be imposed on the basis of an individual's responsibility or wrongdoing. Id. at 1555 n.8. See
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), where the Court held unconsti-
tutional a workmen's compensation statute that barred illegitimate children from recovering
for their mother's wrongful death, while providing that right to legitimate children. The
majority submitted that the asserted state interest of promoting legitimate family relation-
ships had no significant bearing on the recognized purposes of workmen's compensation. Id.
at 175. There, Justice Powell stated:
Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic con-
cept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and pe-
nalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deter-
ring the parent.
Id. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505
(1976). See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 1554. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).




a period sufficiently long in duration be provided to afford to those
with an interest in illegitimate children a reasonable opportunity
to assert claims on the children's behalf.2 In addition, he stated,
any time constraint placed on that opportunity must be substan-
tially related to the state's interest in avoiding the prosecution of
stale or fraudulent claims.2 6 Applying these two requirements to
the Texas one year statute of limitations, the Court found a denial
of equal protection.27
The majority maintained that Texas had not given illegitimate
children a reasonable opportunity to obtain support, by granting
them only one year within which to acquire it.2 The Court noted
that although under the Texas statute, a paternity suit may be
brought by any person with an interest in the child, 9 during the
child's early years, the suit will often be brought by the mother.
Justice Rehnquist cited some of the obstacles to the filing of a
timely suit that an unwed mother might encounter during the
child's first year, including financial difficulties caused by child-
birth expenses or a birth related loss of income, continuing affec-
tion by the mother for the child's father, a wish to avoid disap-
proval of community and family, or the emotional strain and
confusion associated with the birth of an illegitimate child.30 He
further noted that even if the mother seeks public financial assis-
tance and assigns the support claim to the state, it is still conceiva-
ble that a timely filing would not be effected.3 1 Months may pass
before the mother realizes the need for assistance, seeks it, and
then is willing to join the State in bringing action against the natu-
ral father.
32
Justice Rehnquist maintained that the one year limitation was
not substantially related to the state's interest in avoiding the liti-
gation of stale or fraudulent claims. 83 He indicated that the Court





29. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03 (Vernon 1975) which provides: "A suit affecting
the parent-child relationship may be brought by any person with an interest in the child
(through a representative authorized by the court), any agency of the state or of a political
subdivision of the state, and any authorized agency." Id.
30. 102 S. Ct. at 1555.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Justice Rehnquist labeled the one year limitation "unreasonably short." Id.
34. 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam).
1983
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not to be treated lightly,3 ' a complete denial of support to illegiti-
mate children could not be justified on this basis.3" Nor could such
problems of proof justify a period of limitation so short that those
children are effectively foreclosed from obtaining support.37 The
Court was not aware of any evidence vital to a paternity suit that
would be lost in only one year. 8 Nor did Justice Rehnquist believe
that the passage of twelve months would have a significant effect
upon the likelihood of fraudulent claims.3 9 Therefore, the Court re-
versed and remanded the decision of the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals. 4°
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the ma-
jority's result and with the Court's two part equal protection anal-
ysis."1 However, she explained that the opinion did not endorse the
constitutionality of longer statutes of limitations, such as the four
year period now being used in Texas.4
2
Justice O'Connor noted that the state's asserted interest in the
avoidance of stale or fraudulent claims was neither of sufficient im-
portance nor substantially related to the limitation so as to sustain
the statute under the fourteenth amendment.4 Justice O'Connor
stated that even though the appellee asserted a number of other
interests to justify the one year limitation, only the state's interest
in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims was ac-
ceptable." After reviewing the adverse circumstances cited by the
majority as frequently accompanying the birth of an illegitimate
child, she reiterated the Court's conclusion that a one year period
is insufficiently long to permit the filing of a timely action for child
support. 6 She also observed that there was nothing to indicate
that the period was substantially related to the asserted interest in
avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims."6
Further, Justice O'Connor pointed out that in addition to birth-
35. Id. at 538. See supra note 15.




40. Id. at 1556.
41. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Joining Justice O'Connor's opinion were Chief Jus-
tice Burger, and Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Id. Justice Powell joined in pt. I of her
opinion only. Id. at 1558.
42. Id. at 1556 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See supra note 2.






related circumstances dictating the Court's conclusion, the
strength of the supposed state interest was undercut by a compet-
ing state interest in ensuring that genuine claims for child support
are fulfilled.4 It was submitted that this interest arises not only
from a desire to do justice, but also from a desire to reduce the
number of persons on state welfare.4 By making it more difficult
for illegitimate children to obtain support from their natural fa-
thers, the state's one year limitation could only increase the bur-
den on the state welfare system.4 Thus, while the state has an in-
terest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims, it
also has a significant competing interest to ensure that genuine
claims for child support are not denied.50
Justice O'Connor also deemed it to be significant to the Court's
conclusion that a paternity suit in Texas is one of the few causes of
action for which the statute of limitations does not toll during the
plaintiff's minority.51 It was observed that many difficult problems
of proof occur in other civil actions, but only the issue of paternity,
which is unique to illegitimate children, has been singled out for
special treatment.52 Justice O'Connor concluded that when this ob-
servation is coupled with the Texas legislature's efforts to signifi-
cantly restrict any opportunity that an illegitimate child would
47. Id. at 1556-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97,
569 P.2d 1148 (1977), in which the court, holding the natural father liable for support, com-
mented: "The state has a compelling interest in assuring that the primary obligation for
support of illegitimate children falls on both natural parents rather than on the taxpayers of
this state." Id. at 102, 569 P.2d at 1151.
48. 102 S. Ct. at 1557 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. & n.3. Most statutes of limitation in Texas are covered by Tax. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), which provides:
If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this subdivision of this title
be at the time the cause of action accrues either a minor, a married person under
twenty-one years of age, a person imprisoned or a person of unsound mind, the time
of such disability shall not be deemed a portion of the time limited for the com-
mencement of the action and such person shall have the same time after the removal
of his disability that is allowed to others by the provisions of this title.
Id. See, e.g., Simpson v. City of Abilene, 388 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), where a
minor child was injured after being run over by a truck. Although the child failed to bring a
negligence action within the two year statute of limitations, it was held that his claim was
not barred, since the limitation period had tolled during his minority. This was concluded in
spite of the court ruling that the father's claim was barred because of the limitation having
expired. If the one year limitation were tolled during an illegitimate child's minority, action
for support could be filed up until one year after the child had attained the age of majority,
18 years. Id. at 761-63.
52. 102 S. Ct. at 1557 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1983
Duquesne Law Review
have to obtain support, it is fair to wonder whether the constraints
placed upon illegitimates are designed to advance permissible state
interests.53
Finally, Justic6 O'Connor pointed out that the obstacles to.
bringing the action within one year of birth, could just as easily
exist several years subsequent to the birth of an illegitimate
child."' For instance, the father could provide support for the ille-
gitimate child for several years after its birth., The mother would
understandably be reluctant to jeopardize her relationship with the
father under these circumstances, by filing suit in order to protect
the child's right to support at some indeterminate future date.",
Alternatively, the child could have lived alone with his father for a
number of years, making it highly improbable that during this pe-
riod the child would bring action against the father.57 Conse-
quently, Justice O'Connor found that the risk that the child would
be left without support from the natural father is likely to occur at
any time throughout minority.58
In conclusion, Justice O'Connor indicated that the same factors
causing the one year limitation to be unconstitutional could also
cause longer periods of limitation to be unconstitutional as well.59
She stated that she joined the Court's decision only because she
did not read the majority's opinion as prejudging the constitution-
ality of longer statutes of limitation."0
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell agreed only with the
judgment of the majority but not with its opinion, and also joined
part I of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion expressing concern
that longer periods of limitation not be prejudged.6 1 He also noted,
as Justice O'Connor had, that it was significant that an illegiti-
53. Id. See Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Delley, 581 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1979), in which the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals held that the general four year stat-
ute of limitations tolled during the minority of an illegitimate in a paternity action for those
born prior to the effective date of the one year limitation, but subsequent to Gomez v. Pe-
rez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) being decided. That court also subscribed to the conclusions set
forth in State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 102, 569 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977), that the state has a
compelling interest to ensure that the obligation to support illegitimate children falls upon
the natural parents, rather than on the taxpayers. 581 S.W.2d at 521-22.
54. 102 S. Ct. at 1557 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1557-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 1558 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. This was reflected in pt. II of her opinion, in which Justice Powell did not join.
60. Id.
61. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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mate's paternity action was one of the few causes of action in
Texas in which the statute of limitations did not toll during the
plaintiff's minority."2
Historically, under both common law and statute, Texas had
recognized that a natural father had a primary and unconditional
duty to support his legitimate children.s Nevertheless, he owed no
such obligation to his illegitimate children." In fact, Texas com-
mon law went so far as to hold that illegitimate children had no
right to support and that a natural father could even assert illegiti-
macy as a defense in an action for nonsupport.6 5
Subsequently, in 1973, the United States Supreme Court ruled
in Gomez v. Perez6 that once a judicially enforceable substantive
right was granted to legitimate children, the constitutional guaran-
tee of equal protection dictated that the same right could not be
withheld from illegitimate children simply because their parents
were not married."' Several months after that decision, the Texas
legislature passed a statute enabling a natural father to voluntarily
assume the obligation of supporting his illegitimate children, but it
did not require that he do so.6 As a result of this inadequate legis-
lative response to Gomez, the Texas courts subsequently gave ille-
gitimates a common law right of support comparable to that of le-
gitimates. 9 Stimulated to action once again, the legislature broadly
62. Id. See supra text accompanying note 51.
63. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 536 (1973). See also supra note 15.
64. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537 (1973); Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska,
397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1966). In Home of the Holy Infancy, the court indicated that where
there was no duty to support the child (e.g., such as with illegitimacy), the father was not
entitled to any custodial rights. Id. at 210.
65. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537 (1973). See Curtin v. State, 238 S.W.2d 187, 188
(Tex. Crim. App. 1951), in which the trial court's instructions to the jury, "that in order to
convict appellant [of willful neglect to support his children] they must first find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the children were the legitimate children of appellant" were upheld
on appeal. Id.
66. 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam).
67. 409 U.S. at 538. See supra note 15.
68. See Act of Sept. 1, 1975, ch. 476, § 24, 1975 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1253, 1263-64
(codified at TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 13.21-.24 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)). Section 13.21
establishes a procedure whereby the natural father can voluntarily legitimize his illegitimate
child by executing a statement of paternity which shall be attached to a subsequent court
decree designating the parent-child relationship. In addition, § 13.22 provides guidelines for
executing a statement of paternity, and § 13.23 explains the effect of such a statement. If
the statement were executed before Jan. 1, 1974, § 13.24 provides that it is valid and bind-
ing even if not made in compliance with § 13.22 and not filed with the court.
69. See Ex rel. R.V.M., 530 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). In light of Gomez and
in the absence of appropriate action by the legislature, the court held that illegitimate chil-
dren have an identical right to support as that possessed by legitimates. Id. at 923.
1983 537
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amended the Texas Family Code so as to recognize that illegiti-
mate children are entitled to support similar to legitimates. 70 But,
this newly created right was then severely constrained by the con-
comitant enactment of the one year statute of limitations struck
down in Mills.
7 1
Before 1968, American courts had not given serious considera-
tion to the rights of illegitimates. At that time, the United States
Supreme Court decided Levy v. Louisiana72 and Glona v. Ameri-
can Guarantee & Liability Co.,"3 which are based on the proposi-
tion that to deny an individual substantive rights solely on the ba-
sis of his or her illegitimacy is without justification. These two
cases could conceivably have been used as precedent for striking
down all infringements upon the rights of illegitimates, in total dis-
regard of any ostensible state interest.
7'
The Court, however, in later cases required a blanket exclusion
of illegitimates before determining a discriminatory statute to be
invalid.75 The level of scrutiny applied by the Court several years
70. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Courts in other states have sustained
similar statutes of limitations by significantly restricting their effect. See, e.g., Stringer v.
Dudoich, 92 N.M. 98, 583 P.2d 462 (1978); Palmer v. Mangum, 338 So. 2d 1002 (Miss. 1976).
These cases determined that the limitation applied only to the mother and that the illegiti-
mate child could bring suit at any time up until its majority. See also Cessna v. Montgom-
ery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976). In Cessna, a two year limitation was sustained, but
it was held that a putative father may be estopped as a result of his own actions, from
asserting the limitation as a defense.
71. See supra note 2. See also 102 S. Ct. at 1551, 1552, 1556.
72. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levy, the Court found a wrongful death statute violative of
equal protection guarantees by not permitting an illegitimate child to bring suit on behalf of
its mother, while nevertheless granting that right to legitimates. Id. at 71.
73. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Glona, a companion case to Levy, struck down a similar statute
that barred a mother from bringing a wrongful death action on behalf of her illegitimate
child, while granting that right in respect to her legitimate children. Id. at 75.
74. See Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges The Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisi-
ana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(1969): "We conclude, however, that Levy and Glona provide a basis from which all the
major legal disadvantages suffered by reason of illegitimacy can be challenged successfully."
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
75. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), where in the face of Levy and Glona,
the Court sustained a Louisiana statute that barred illegitimate children from sharing
equally with the legitimate heirs in their father's estate. The majority stated that in promot-
ing family life or controlling the disposition of property within the state, "[a]bsent a specific
constitutional guarantee, it is for [the] legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this Court,
to select from among possible laws." Id. at 538-39. Compare Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977), in which the Illinois Supreme Court, relying on Labine, upheld the constitution-
ality of an intestate statute permitting illegitimate children to inherit only from their
mothers, while legitimates could inherit from both parents. The Supreme Court distin-
guished Labine, reversing, and striking down the statute on the ground that the Illinois
Supreme Court had "failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between the ex-
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ago appeared inconsistent, lacking clear and definitive guidelines.
For example, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 76 it was
strongly implied that illegitimacy was a suspect classification,
which, like race and alienage, required the strictest level of scru-
tiny. Nevertheless, four years later in Mathews v. Lucas,7 7 that no-
tion was expressly refuted. Justice Blackmun, writing for the ma-
jority in Lucas, indicated that the level of scrutiny relating to
illegitimates was less than strict, but more than minimum. 78 Later
decisions have consistently applied this standard, defining it as a
requirement that classifications based on illegitimacy be substan-
tially related to permissible state interests.
7 9
In Mills, the Court applied a two part analysis to determine
whether equal protection guarantees were being met. The majority
required that any time limitation placed on the illegitimate child's
opportunity to obtain support be substantially related to the
state's interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent
tremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity. . .[by excluding
certain] illegitimate children unnecessarily ...." Id. at 770-71.
76. 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972). In Weber, Justice Powell stated: "Courts are power-
less to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these helpless children, but the Equal
Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of
birth where-as in this case-the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest,
compelling or otherwise." Id. (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (race); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (race); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (alienage)).
77. 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976). The Lucas Court upheld a federal statute that required
illegitimate children to establish dependency upon a deceased parent (if not living with the
parent at time of death) to qualify for social security survivors' benefits, while a presump-
tion of dependency was provided for legitimate children. Id.
78. Id. at 510. In its analysis, the Court stated that "the scrutiny by which their show-
ing is to be judged is not a toothless one ...." Id. In Weber, the Court stated that
"Itihough the latitude given state economic and social regulations is necessarily broad, when
state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this
Court exercises a stricter scrutiny ...." 406 U.S. at 172 (citations omitted).
79. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 265 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770-
73 (1977). In Lalli, a New York intestate statute was sustained even though in order for an
illegitimate to inherit from his natural father, a court of competent jurisdiction had to enter
an order of paternity during the father's lifetime. See also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 388-89 (1979) (New York statute that allowed the mother, but not the father, of an
illegitimate child to withhold consent that precluded adoption of the child invalidated);
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 360 (1979) (statute barring the father of an illegitimate
child, who could have but did not legitimize the child by petitioning the local court, from
suing for the wrongful death of that child upheld). In United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23
(1980), the Court dealt with a federal statute that enabled surviving children of a deceased
federal employee to collect survivors' annuity benefits. However, stepchildren and illegiti-
mate "recognized children" were required to have "lived with" the employee prior to his
death. The Court sustained this statute by construing "lived with" to mean at any time
prior to, or at the time of the employee's death. Id. at 33.
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claims. Additionally, it was required that illegitimate children be
afforded a reasonable period of time to bring an action for sup-
port.80 The rationale behind the latter requirement is that a right
lacks substance when granted under conditions effectively preclud-
ing most of those entitled to the right from enjoying it. Since an
illegitimate child less than one year old is hardly capable of bring-
ing a paternity action on its own, someone must act on the child's
behalf. Logically, this person is usually the mother, but as Justice
Rehnquist emphasized, it is highly improbable that a timely suit
will be filed by her, given the many obstacles that can arise with
the birth of the child." Thus, in order to comply with the mandate
in Gomez that problems of proof not be made an "impenetrable
barrier," the right to support granted illegitimate children must be
more than illusory.82
The requirement that illegitimate children be afforded a reason-
able period of time within which to bring suit under the statute
could have alternatively been a denial of due process, even though
the majority stated that due process arguments need not be con-
sidered.83 Such a point of view was expressed by Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority in Boddie v. Connecticut.8 4 Boddie offered
extensive support for defining the concept of due process as requir-
ing an opportunity for access to the courts to be given in a "mean-
80. 102 S. Ct. at 1555. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the
issue was whether or not due process required that a welfare recipient be given an eviden-
tiary hearing prior to termination of benefits. Id. at 260. The Court indicated that "[tihe
opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who
are to be heard." Id. at 268-69.
81. 102 S. Ct. at 1555. See State Dep't of Health v. West, 378 So. 2d 1220, 1222 (Fla.
1979).
82. 102 S. Ct. at 1555. Justice Rehnquist recognized that although the Court had
stated in Gomez that problems relating to proof of paternity were "not to be lightly brushed
aside," it qualified that by emphasizing that nor were they to be made into an "impenetra-
ble barrier." 409 U.S. at 538. See supra note 15. The Justice's conclusion can be read as
saying that the Texas legislature had created such a barrier with the one year limitation in
the instant case. 102 S. Ct. at 1554-55. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals had previously, in
Chapman, considered the same question holding that a state may not "absolutely foreclose"
an illegitimate's support right, but that the one year limitation did not have such an effect.
See 570 S.W.2d at 48. See also supra note 10.
83. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
84. 401 U.S. at 371, 378 (1971). In Boddie, the majority held that it was a denial of
due process to force indigents to pay fees they could not afford as a prerequisite to bringing
an action for divorce. See also Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1955), in which
notice of foreclosure given to an unprotected incompetent, who was unable to understand
the implications of proceedings against her property, was deemed a violation of due process.
The factual setting in Covey is analogous to that in the instant case where the illegitimate
child, because of its minority, cannot effectively act within the one year limitation.
Recent Decisions
ingful time and meaningful manner," in the absence of an overrid-
ing state interest.8 5 However, Justice Douglas indicated in a
concurring opinion in Boddie that although he agreed with the
Court's result, the holding should have been based upon an equal
protection rationale. s6 He observed that the due process clause had
proven too "elastic" a tool when used by the Court to invalidate
statutes whenever it believed that the legislature had acted un-
wisely, 7 as typified by Lochner v. New York." Justice Douglas
submitted that this previously discarded doctrine of substantive
due process was obsolete and unmanageable and should not be re-
vived. Instead, argued Justice Douglas, the due process clause
should essentially be limited to regulating procedure.89 In Mills, it
appears that the Supreme Court has heeded this advice by decid-
ing the case solely on an equal protection basis.90 Nevertheless,
there is difficulty in distinguishing the majority's equal protection
requirement that the limitation period be long enough to afford a
"reasonable opportunity" in which to bring a claim,91 from the
"meaningful opportunity" dictated by due process.' In both in-
stances, fundamental fairness requires that the state not foreclose
an individual's personal right without giving that person an ade-
quate opportunity to be heard.
Although it did not do so, the Mills Court could have struck
down the one year limitation on the alternative ground that the
statute was overinclusive by its exclusion of all illegitimates, re-
gardless of whether there was a problem of proof.93 Assuming that
85. 401 U.S. at 377.
86. Id. at 383-86 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas stated that "[alffluence
does not pass muster under the equal protection clause for determining who must remain
married and who shall be allowed to separate." Id. at 386 (Douglas, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 384 (Douglas, J., concurring).
88. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the United States Supreme Court found unconsti-
tutional a New York statute that limited the number of hours bakeries could force employ-
ees to work, on the ground that it interfered with the liberty to freely contract. The basis for
doing so was "substantive due process," which in effect permitted the Court to arbitrarily
strike down any legislation with which it disagreed. Id. at 61. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
89. 401 U.S. at 384 (Douglas, J., concurring).
90. 102 S. Ct. at 1553.
91. Id. at 1555. See supra notes 82, 85 and accompanying text.
92. 401 U.S. at 377. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
93. 430 U.S. at 771. In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), an intestacy statute
was found to be unconstitutional because certain illegitimate children were excluded with-
out reason. The Court indicated that the statute had failed to be "carefully tuned to alter-
native considerations," and that "difficulties of proving paternity do not justify the total
statutory disinheritance of (all] illegitimate children whose fathers die intestate." Id. at 772.
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the reliability of certain evidence necessary to prove paternity di-
minishes within a twelve month period, nevertheless there exist
suits that could be sustained without that particular evidence. Be-
cause the statute conclusively bars all paternity suits brought after
one year, it appears to be overinclusive by also barring those with-
out proof problems.
In fact, the only paternity suits that usually go to trial in Texas
are those in which the putative father has either refused to take a
blood test, or has not been excluded by the results of such a test.
The Texas Code, in pretrial proceedings, requires the mother, al-
leged father, and child to submit to one or more blood tests."4 In
light of the current state of the art in blood testing, this would
produce a better than ninety percent chance that one falsely ac-
cused of paternity would never go to trial.9 5 Therefore, where a pa-
ternity action in Texas would require use of conventional evidence
in court, the probability would be significantly higher that the pur-
ported father was also the actual father. Thus, the state's asserted
interest of preventing fraudulent claims appears even more
This is unlike the statute in Mathews v. Lucas which was "tuned to alternative considera-
tions" where a presumption against the illegitimate child keeping it from qualifying for So-
cial Security survivorship benefits could be overcome by proof of dependency upon the de-
cedent. See 427 U.S. 495, 513. See supra note 77.
94. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), which provides:
(a) When the respondent appears in a paternity suit, the court shall order the
mother, alleged father, and child to submit to the taking of blood for the purpose of
one or more blood tests. If the appearance is before the birth of the child, the court
shall order the taking of blood as soon as medically practical after birth.
(b) An order issued under this section is enforceable by contempt, except that if
the petitioner is the mother or the alleged father and refuses to submit to the blood
test, the court shall dismiss the suit. If the respondent is the mother or the alleged
father and refuses to submit to the blood test, the fact of refusal may be introduced
as evidence ...
Id.
95. 102 S. Ct. at 1557 n.2. See also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). Blood testing
is a negative rather than positive test. If the putative father's blood group is not one from
which the child's blood type could be inherited, he cannot be the father. However, if the
father's blood is of the same type as the child's, there is only a possibility that he might be
the father and conventional evidence is then required for a final determination. Id. at 7. In
Little, the majority considered blood tests to be of such importance that the denial of them
to an indigent purported father unable to pay the associated costs, constituted a violation of
due process. Id. at 17. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court and quoting as authority a
report developed jointly by the American Bar Association and the American Medical Associ-
ation, stated that the tests "were found to be 'reasonable' in cost and to provide a 91 %
cumulative probability of negating paternity for erroneously accused negro men and 93%
for white men." Id. at 7-8. See Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell & Krause, Joint AMA-ABA
Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10
FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976).
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tenuous.
Problems of proof also exist in other civil actions, as Justice
O'Connor pointed out in her Mills concurrence. e6 However, only
those proof problems relating to a paternity suit brought by an il-
legitimate child are singled out in the Texas Code for exceptional
treatment.97 In Lalli v. Lalli, Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opin-
ion joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens, expressed a
preferable way of screening out fraudulent paternity claims, sug-
gesting the use of an elevated standard of proof.98 Justice Brennan
argued that a standard of "clear and convincing" or perhaps even
"beyond a reasonable doubt" could be used in lieu of a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. 99 Additionally, in Trimble v.
Gordon, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that occa-
sional difficulties in proving paternity did not justify the blanket
exclusion of all illegitimate children from their statutory inheri-
tance.0 0 Thus, difficulties of proof should not justify the blanket
exclusion of all illegitimate children from their right to paternal
support.
The other interest asserted by Texas, avoidance of stale claims,
is also based on questionable logic.' 10 The right to support,
whether belonging to an illegitimate or a legitimate, has been held
by several courts to be a recurring one renewed daily until the
child reaches the age of eighteen years. 0 2 The theory carries over
96. 102 S. Ct. at 1557. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. See 439 U.S. at 277-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. See supra note 93. Justice Powell was joined in this opinion by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, and White. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Stewart dissented.
101. 102 S. Ct. at 1553-55.
102. See, e.g., State Dep't of Health v. West, 378 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1979). In deciding
whether a paternity action was barred by a four year statute of limitations, the Florida
Supreme Court stated:
The state's -objective to avoid stale claims, however, is not valid justification for the
discrimination it inflicts on illegitimates since their right to support is a continuing
right renewing itself until the child becomes eighteen. An action to determine pater-
nity is not a stale claim when employed as a prerequisite to an illegitimate's obtaining
of continuing, recurring support. This right has never become dormant, and for the
statute of limitations to act to preclude this right on the basis that it is stale is
illogical.
Id. at 1227. See also County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson, 46 N.C. App. 182, 264
S.E.2d 816 (1980). In another action brought against the natural father for support, a three
year statute of limitations purported to bar recovery. In its analysis, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals noted that "a child is entitled to support from its father throughout its
minority. Therefore, a child's claim for such support at any time during its minority can
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to a determination of paternity, since that action is an integral
part of any claim an illegitimate may have for support. Based in
part on this rationale, in State Department of Health v. West103
and County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson," 4 courts in both
Florida and North Carolina struck down statutes similar to the
Texas provision,"° but with limitations of four years'0 6 and three
years, 0 " respectively. Those courts determined that the child's
claim for support, along with the state's interest in keeping the
child off the welfare rolls, far outweighed any interest the state
might have in preventing the prosecution of fraudulent claims.10 8
Finally, borrowing from the language in Gomez, 09 it was concluded
that the statutes of limitations in these cases created an "impene-
trable barrier" to an illegitmate child's right to support, particu-
larly in the absence of being tuned to alternative considerations. 10
Justice O'Connor also pointed out in Mills that the counter-
vailing state interest in ensuring that bona fide claims for child
support are satisfied, overrides any concern the state may have in
avoiding stale or fraudulent claims.' Additionally, she questioned
the special treatment accorded problems of proving paternity set
forth in the Texas Code.11 2 Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell endorsed these principles by join-
ing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.' 1 3 However, subscribing
to the majority's viewpoint, but conspicuously absent from Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion were Justices Marshall, Stevens,
and White.1 4 In both Lalli and Trimble, these three Justices had
supported the notion that the proper way of handling fraudulent
claims was to raise the standard of proof.' 5 It is difficult to discern
whether these Justices now agree with Justice Rehnquist's position
in Mills that a state's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or
fraudulent claims is justification for certain restrictions that may
never be said to be stale." Id. at 192, 264 S.E.2d at 821.
103. 378 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1979).
104. 46 N.C. App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980).
105. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
106. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(b) (West 1982).
107. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(c)(1) (1976) (amended 1981).
108. 378 So. 2d at 1227-28; 46 N.C. App. at 183, 264 S.E.2d at 821.
109. 409 U.S. at 538.
110. 378 So. 2d at 1227-28; 46 N.C. App. at 188, 264 S.E.2d at 820-21.
111. 102 S. Ct. at 1556-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1557 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. See 102 S. Ct. at 1549, 1556.
114. See id.
115. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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be placed upon an illegitimate child's right to paternal support, or
whether they did not join Justice O'Connor's concurrence only be-
cause of her failure to expressly submit that an increased standard
of proof was, in comparison to a statute of limitations, a more ac-
ceptable way of handling stale or fraudulent claims.
In either case, the Court's decision in Mills continues to perpet-
uate the belief that the avoidance of stale or fraudulent claims may
justify a statute of limitations in paternity actions for illegitimates
that is not coterminous with that for legitimate children.1 6 How-
ever, based on a growing consensus," 7 these professed state inter-
ests seem to be of questionable future vitality.
G.H. Danvers
116. 102 S. Ct. at 1554.
117. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
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